ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The Swedish distribution networks are exposed to different types of weather disturbances. Most common are strong winds and large quantities of snow. Before 2006 there were no evident rules in the Swedish electricity act that regulated continuity of electricity supply. Instead, the legislator had chosen voluntary agreements to improve the continuity of supply.
In January 2005 the southern districts of Sweden were hit by powerful winds reaching hurricane strength in some cases. There were devastating effects in big parts of the southern region of Götaland but also the central region of Svealand was affected. More than 600 000 customers were hit by power outages. Approximately 50 percent of the customers got their electricity back within 24 hours. 70 000 customers in the countryside were without electricity more than one week. Approximately 10 000 customers lacked electricity more than 20 days, figure 1.
The distribution networks with uninsulated lines were seriously damaged by fallen trees and branches. Also the insulated lines, that normally are more durable against falling trees, were destroyed. In some areas even the regional transmission network was damaged.
New legislation
After the storm, named Gudrun, in January 2005 the Swedish government commissioned The Energy Markets Inspectorate, the Swedish regulating authority, to suggest measures in order to ensure a more secure electricity transfer. The commission intended, among other things, to submit proposals for requirements on functionality for electricity distribution and consider how the network companies could carry out risk and vulnerability analysis.
The Energy Markets Inspectorate's report to the Swedish government in April 2005 expressed proposals for a major change in the electricity act that would improve the continuity of supply [1] . For example:
• A requirement that limits the length of a power interruption to 24 hours • Stricter requirements for load levels over 2 MW.
• Detailed rules for compensation to customers that are hit by power outages.
• Requirements on the power network companies to implement risk and vulnerability analysis and action plans. The rules that concern risk and vulnerability analysis for power network companies were introduced in the Swedish electricity act in January 2006 [2] . In September 2006 the regulating authority, Energy Markets Inspectorate, was authorized to issue new directions on the scope of the requirement.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS
The Swedish electricity act states that each power network company must produce a risk and vulnerability analysis as well as an action plan. The scope of the analysis that is required will be found in the regulations that the Energy Markets Inspectorate has been authorized to issue. Initially some of the network companies' positions regarding risk analysis were mapped out. It was done through contacts with a number of power network companies and Swedenergy (a non profit organisation representing companies in the energy sector). The Swedish legislation that concerns risk, which related to the new rules in the electricity act, was also mapped out. The work resulted in a report [3] .
During the end of 2007 the direction work started. It was divided into two parts: The first part aimed at giving a basis to the final formulation of the directions. A report dealing with the monitoring process, contents and scope of risk and vulnerability analysis and experiences from Great Britain was published on Energy Markets Inspectorates webpage in May 2008 [4] . During the process a dialogue began with the project group at Swedenergy which worked on guidelines that concerns risk and vulnerability analysis for network operators [5] .
As part of the process contact has been established with the British regulating authority OFGEM. They described their work to motivate the power network companies to become certified according to the standard PAS 55 [6, 7, 9] . The method which clearly points out the power network companies' responsibilities has been assessed as promising.
In part one of the directions project the British model was considered. Could the model be used under Swedish circumstances? The answer points out that it is possible but the process requires long time to implement. One difficulty is the amount of small network companies in Sweden.
The second part of the process started in June 2008 and the aim was to write the paragraphs of the direction.
Demarcations
A difficulty when formulating the regulation is that Swedish legislation contains many other acts about risks concerning important functions in society. Electricity supply is an important monitoring task for local and regional authorities.
Risk and vulnerability analysis regulation for power network companies concerns a small part of the complexity of problems with risks within the energy sector. The risk and vulnerability analysis established by power network companies will however be one part in planning for reduction of risks within the electricity supply.
This document will only discuss the requirements in the electricity act. The overall perspective concerning risks in society is found in a number of other laws.
NATIONAL CONDITIONS
Sweden is a northern country with cold and snowy winters. Because Sweden is narrow and covers a long distance from north to south it is exposed to different climate zones. In the northern region, the winters are long with a lot of snow, but relatively safe from strong wind due to the Scandinavian mountain chain. Also the fact that the networks mainly follow long valleys along the big rivers gives a certain protection.
In the southern part of the country the winters are shorter but windier. Low pressures from the south west often hit the country. The storm 2005 was followed by a similar storm 2007, named Per, and several smaller storms 2008.
Periodically big quantities of wet snow have caused power outages and fallen trees on power lines. This weather type is relatively common and some years it has led to considerable disturbances on countryside electricity supply.
RISK ANALYSIS
During the 20th century managing risks has changed from being an art based on experience and gut feelings to become a science. Systematic methods have been developed and some have been adapted for special applications. This means that the legal demand for risk assessment does not require the invention of new techniques. Instead the existing common knowledge in the area should be used. Among these applicable cornerstones we find the IEC standard 60300-3-9 on risk assessment for technological systems [8] .
It describes the vocabulary, process and established methods for risk assessments. Likewise established is the way to visualise risks in a diagram with probability on one axis and consequences on the other. In such a presentation, usually called a risk matrix, high risks are found in the upper right corner, figure 4.
The legal demands call for a simple beginning and an increasing level of details as the network companies learn to do more extensive risk assessments [2] . This means that a reasonable approach for a first risk assessment would be to apply the preliminary hazard analysis method sketching the estimated risks in a simple risk matrix.
The law calls for a risk-and vulnerability assessment. Normally vulnerability can be seen as the long term negative results for society if a hazard is realised. Vulnerability for a power grid, on the other hand, comes in terms of the amount of customers affected by a black-out (or the power affected) or the energy not delivered and the estimated time to be up and running again. It is very hard for the network operator to know consequences for electricity end users or the society as a whole. This is because the company does not normally know what their customers have planned to do in case of a blackout. In the case of risk management for continuity of supply demanded by the network owners there is therefore a very small difference between estimating vulnerability and estimating the consequences as part of the risk assessment.
An initial step in the risk assessment is hazard identification. Several hazards are already known to be important for electricity distribution. Some examples are: due to weather -storms and wet snow; due to climate changes -increasing frequencies of lightning and floods; due to demands for increased profits -lack of sufficient maintenance and investments; due to organisational reasons -outsourcing and entrepreneurial activities. There are also hazards know to be negligible in Sweden, e.g. earthquakes, large wild fires and organized criminality.
The risk assessment process normally finds hazards considering events (land slide, fires, bird shortcutting transformers). However the Swedish network operators normally approaches the technical hardware as such, assessing in a second step what can happen to defined equipment. The Energy Markets Inspectorate has in this case decided that it is a better idea to allow the operators to continue what they are used to do instead of trying to mould them into the approaches normal for risk assessment. The approaches used for hazard identification will not be decisive for the over all result in terms of estimated risks ranked for the need of action to improve continuity of supply.
Consequences Probability
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The directions for risk and vulnerability analysis and action plans are designed considering the large legal demands on network companies. The intention is to make the job as easy as possible through the use of established methods.
A minimum step for all networks companies will begin with the process of a preliminary hazard analysis as it is described in IEC 60300-3-9 [8] and also describe the analysis in a risk matrix. The requirements on the documentation of the risk analysis process are relatively high. The documentation has to be transparent and The results from the process have to be reported to the regulator in an annual risk assessment report. The reporting is relatively simple. It shall only answer a few control questions to demonstrate that the network companies have done their job.
It is important that the uses of established methods are confirmed. The risks exposed in the analysis process shall be reported in the five technologically related categories: network construction technique, network equipment and devices, network topology, organisation/working processes and remaining risks.
A more complicated part of the process is that Swedish law demands that no customer shall ever experience an interruption for more than 24 hours, expect force majeure reasons. This regulation will be in force from January 2011. Network operators will do their part to achieve this. At the same time they know the fallibility of all technical systems and can estimate the probability for not being able to fulfil the legal requirements. The companies have not been content with the regulator's suggestion that this estimation shall be part of the annual risk assessment report.
The last part in the annual risk assessment report concerns the action plan. All exposed risks in need of reduction have to be labelled with unique identities and listed in the action plan. These parts of the action plan will be reported together with information on the time the actions are completed.
The annual assessment report concerning 172 network companies consists of 177 geographic areas. The reports can be handed in through the regulating authority's webpage. The information will be compiled by the regulator and published on its webpage, accessible for electricity customers and other stakeholders.
THE FUTURE
It is important that the regulation is flexible when the responsibility and knowledge is found in the network companies. A rigid regulation would become too resourceintensive for the network companies and the regulator.
The monitoring process must be convincing and corrective. This is important for the development of the process in the long run. A fundamental review of all annual reports will be performed on a yearly basis. An exhaustive control will also be done in some random selected companies.
The most important source for the development of continuity of supply is reported interruption data. From 2011 short and long interruption data have to be reported for each point of delivery, in accordance with requirements in the Swedish electricity act. Reported information will along with interruption data be the basis for a further monitoring process. The first step is analysis of interruption data. If there is abnormal interruption levels a review of the complete action plan has to be carried out. If this reveals that the action plan has been implemented according to conclusive plans the next stage is to check the complete risk and vulnerability analysis.
For the future it is also of interest to develop the regulation towards a certification like PAS 55, as the British regulator OFGEM has done [6, 9] . The implementation of a PAS 55 certification in the Swedish regulation should be possible since that regulation, as it has been described in this paper, already imposes a big responsibility on the network companies. An increased harmonization within EEC also indicates a development in that direction. However, a difficulty is that the network is divided into172 different companies of which approximately 50 percent have fever than 10 000 customers.
